Multimedia content delivery applications are becoming widespread thanks to increasingly cheaper access to high bandwidth networks. Also, the pervasiveness of XML as a data interchange format. has given rise to a number of standard formats for lIlultimedia, such as Sl\HL for multimedia presentations, SVG for vector graphics, VoiceXML for dialog, and MPEG-21 for video. Innovative programming paradigms (such as the one of Web services) rely on the availability of XML-based markup and metadata in the multimedia flow in order to customize and add value to multimedia content distributed via the Net. In this paper, we present. a general access control model for multimedia information that allows for expressing complex filtering conditions on a wide range of properties of multimedia data. Access control policies' syntax and enforcement is illustrated by applying the model to some of XML-based multimedia data formats for multimedia.
Introduction
Multimedia information (such as free text, audio, video, images and animations) is of paramount importance for human-computer interaction in a number of application fields, such as entertainment, distance learning, collaboration, and others. Multimedia data have been available for a long time over nearly all transport infrastructures, and are now becoming even more widespread thanks to the increasingly cheaper access to high bandwidth networks. However, the importance of complementing binary multimedia data with descriptive metadata in the form of XML tagging has been fully realized only recently. XML-based standard formats for multimedia representation such as SMIL [8Jand VoiceXML [9] make the internal structure of multimedia flows available to a variety of consumer applications and devices. More ambitious efforts, such as MPEG-21, are aimed at achieving the same results for video. Intelligent applications like search indexes, topic maps or browsable directories can use XML tagging and auxiliary metadata to identify the structural or semantics-related components of multimedia flows, such as keywords, key frames, audiovisual summaries, semantic concepts, color histograms, shapes, as well as recognized speech. XML formats are paving the way to a new generation of applications even in more traditional fields such as image processing. For instance, raster graphical formats (e.g., GIF or JPEG) have severe limitations, inasmuch they do not carry any information that can be queried, re-organized, or searched through. Scalable Vector Gr'aphics (SVG) [7Jis an XML-based language for describing two-dimensional vector and mixed vector/raster graphics that works well across platforms, across output resolutions and color spaces. Also, SVG cleanly specifies the image structure, allowing applications to p'rocess data at a finer level of granularity. The wealth of semantics-and structure-related information carried by new XML-based multimedia formats suggests that the time has come to enrich traditional, coarse-grained access control models with a number of new concepts that are specific to the nature and meaning of multimedia data. In our approach, all semantics-related and structural components of multimedia data, such as a room in the vector-based map of a building or a range in the frequency spectrum of an audio clip are considered first-class citizens when writing fine-grained access and fruition policies for lIlultimedia. An interesting consequence of using XML for writing our fine-grained access policies is that XML elements used to refer to multimedia components inside policies can be mapped to XML tags and metadata in the data flow. Policy-to-data mapping can be customized to the particular XML-based multimedia format under discussion, achieving fast and effective enforcement either via data filtering or even by encryption. In this paper, we use some popular XML-based formats for multimedia to illustrate our approach, showing fine-grained access and fruition policies referring to specific components of the multimedia data, and discussing how they can be efficiently enforced via on-line data transformation.
General structure of an XML-based Illultimedia document
Preliminaries
We now describe the document abstraction model on which our approach is based and give some preliminary concepts that will be llsed throughout the papeL Specifically, we consider the general problem of protecting multimedia data associated with XML-based metadata formats, such as SVG [7] for vector graphics, VoiceXML [9] for dialog, and SMIL [8] for creating interactive multimedia presentations, XML-based metadata formats for multimedia differ ill terms of the type of binary data they organize and represent; however, they do share a comlllon structure and semantics, As depicted in Figure 1 , XML-based documents attached to multimedia data follow the same general structure of all XML-based documents, They include a root element (e,g" <svg> for SVG documents and <vxml> for VoiceXML documents), a IJr'carnble, and a body, The preamble of an XML-based multimedia document usually includes one or more declarations, whose scope is the whole document. Such declarations are delimited by a pair of start and end tags. For instance, the preamble of a VoiceXML document may contain: meta elements, for specifying meta information; var and script elements, for defining variables and scripts, respectively; property elements, for setting property values; catch elements, for haudling events; and link elements, for defining links. 1 The body of a multimedia document includes a number of top-level container elements. In our model, a top-level container element is used for grouping together multiple semantically related XML elements. For instance, in a SVG document representing the map of a building, graphical elements used for drawing individual rooms are nested into a suitable container element. Examples of containers are ele- l.
, Figll1'e 2, Rendering of a samp le SVG document showing the map of a Department of Defense mellt g for SVG documents , elements form aud menu for VoiceXML documents , as well as SMIL layout and region elements, More precisely, SVG element g delimits a set of related grap hical elements, VoiceXML elements form and menu represent two different types of dialogs while SMIL layout and region elements enclose Layout Modules,2 While differing in their vocabulary, all XML-based representations of multimedia content follow a common pattern where a (top-level) container element contains other container elements and so on, down to an arbitrary depth, This nested struct ure is indeed not surprising, as XML element containment straightforwardly models the spatial or temporal dependencies which are typ ical of multimedia data, Each element may have its ow n properties, modeled by XML attributes, All container elements in the document can be uniquely identified including the special att ribute id,
Running examples
In the remainder of this paper we refer our examples to to two instances of multimedia documents: a SVG document showing the map of an hypot hetical Department of Defense (see Figure 2 ) and a VoiceXML document (see Figure 3) providing a q7wte service, The SVG docu-'2S1\/IIL mod ul es can be furth e r grouped into profiles , < ?xml vers ion=" 1. 0" encoding=" 150-8859-1"? > < vxml vets ion=" 1. 0" > <noinput> Welcome to Quote Service Inc < form id="Quote" > <field name="OriginZip"> <prompt "> \Vhat is t.he origin ZIP code" < /prompt > <grammar src="st ring.grxllll"l> <Ifield> <field name:"DestinationZip"> <prompt> \-Vhat is the destination ZIP cone? </prompt> <grammar src="string.grxml"l> < lfield> <field name="\Veight"> <prompt> \Vhat is the weight? </prompt> <grammar src="string,grxllli"l> </field> <field <prompt> v..'hat is your corpolute discollnt cone? </prompt> <grammar src="st.ring,grxml"l> <!field> <field name="ServiceType"> <prompt> \Vhat kind of service do you wanl? YOII C[tll choost" horn <enumerate/> < /prompt > <option dtmf="l" value="48h"> 48-110111':'< </option> <option dtmf="2" value="24h"> ::l4-hours </nption> <option dtmf="3" vallle="OverN"> Overnight </option> </field> </form>
Figure S.
A simple VoiceXI\lL docllment ment displays department layout, that is, offices location and control equipment location. Figure 4 (a) illustrates a tree-based representation of the document rendered in Figure 2 , reporting the types associated with the group elements composing its body. In particular, the body is a group element whose identifier is deptdefense; its sub-elements are main_entrance, public-area, and private_area (our sample document defines one group for each of them). Group public-area includes cafeteria, IDoffice, t.wo restroom instances, info_desk, and public-affair office. Each of the latter elements, ill turn, is composed of a graphical representation (i.e., rectRoom, rectRest and rectlnfo definitions), and a name. Group pri vate_area includes emerg_uni t, n&acontrol, computer Joom, four videocamera instances, eight laser _sensor instances, and two alarm_control instances.
Like groups in the publicarea, each of the group in the private_area includes a graphical representation, a name, and possibly some additional groups. For instance, group computer Joom contains six instances of the computer object (called a symbol in SVG terminology). The VoiceXML document in Figure 3· describes an application to get quotes for international deliveries. In particular, a user of this service can specify the ZIP code ,bl
Fig1ll'e 4, Tree-based graphical representation of the SVG document rendered in Figure 2 (a) and of the VuiceXl\IL doclIment in Figure 3 (b) of the ongm and destination, the parcel's weight, a corporate code, and then can select a service type. Figure 4 (b) illustrates a tree-based representation of the Voic:eXML document in Figure 3. 
An access control model for multimedia
We illustrate our model and the main components of our XML-based authorizations. Access authorizations are rules that state which actions performed all multimedia data are to be allowed (or denied). Basically, An example of user 67 each aut.horization has t.hree component.s: the entity (slLbject) against which access must. be controlled; the object to be protect.ed; and the action being aut.horized (or denied). Note that f()!· simplicity, here we limit ourselves to read authorizations. 3 We are now ready to describe subjects and objects of our access rules and to provide implement.ation guidelines.
Subjects
In the Web services programming paradigm, where XML-based multimedia documents are released for distribut.ion, it is crucial to provide a simple and, at the same time, highly expressive language for defiuing authorization subjects. Also, ill such an environment t.he ability t.o access an object often depends on characteristics (attributes) of t.he requestor such as age, citizenships, field-of-specialization, membership to groups [2] [3] , and on his/her role rather than on his/her identity.
Our approach addresses both traditional and role-based access control by support.ing XML pTOfiles. Int.uitively, for each user or role, a profile specifies the values of properties on which the access control model can express conditions. When dealing with traditional access control, profiles can be straightforwardly exploited for supporting informatioll about lLser gTOUpS and user identity. As usual, gm'ups are sets of users hierarchically organized: they can be nested and need not be disjoint [6] . Note that, in order to allow for specifying authorizations based on user and groups, user-group hierarchies needs t.o be explicit.ly defined and be accessible during policy enforcement. We model user profiles as semistructured documents which can be referenced within policies, for instance, by meallS of path expressions [11] . XPath expressions are an handy tool to define a mapping between elements denoting subjects 3Note that supporting other act.ions does not. complicate the authorizat.ion model and can lit' regulated by allowing (or not allowing) access to the corresponding element inside our policies and subject properties in XML user profiles. 4 • An XPath expression is a sequence of element names or predefined functions separated by character / (slash) and is used to identify a node-set (Le., a set of elements and attributes) within an XML document. For instance, XPath expression user _profile/ / [. / / group [@value = C SecurityOfficer '] returns elements useLprof ile selected within profiles of users who belong to group Securi tyOfficer. With respect to profiles in Figure 5 , this XPath expression would return the profile of user Alice. Authorization subjects are defined as XML elements as follows: 
Objects
In our model, any XML element in the multimedia document can be an authorization object. Of course, XPath expressions are an effective way to specify the XML elements to which an authorization applies [5J. However, XPath expressions are only one of the possible ways that can be used to identify authorization objects. Our model allows policy writers to refer to XML elements by using their identifiers (XML id attributes) or, if applicable, their type (attribute typeElement. 5 ) Notations id. value1 and type. value2 are used to denote elements whose identifier and type is value! and value2, respectively. Also, we use a predefined function perimeter() to identify the shape (Le., the drawing 40f course, specialized mappings could be defined to map subjects to XML-based information sources about requestors other than our profiles, such as standard SAML assertions [l)For the sake of simplicity, we do not deal with the technicalities of such mappings in this paper. 5 Attribute typeElement is specific of our model.
Predicates Semantics inside(abj)
It returns the object in the authorization rule ifit is inside an element whose identifier, type, or name is abj togetheLwith(abj)
It returns the object in the authorization rille if it is a child of an element together with an object whose identifier, type, or name is abj numbeLofCabj,n)
It returns the object in the authorization rule if there are n instances of the object whose identifier, type, or name is abj Table 1 . Multimedia predicates instructions) of an element (referenced via its identifier or type). Function parameter () is also used to identify parameters provided by users when they submit their access request and represented in the multimedia document.
In order to provide additional expressive power and flexibility, our model also allows specifying object conditions that identify a set of objects satisfying specific properties. Such conditions are expressed in the form of multimedia predicates. Table 1 illustrates multimedia predicates together with their semantics. Authorization objects are defined as XML-elements of the form:
where object-id 1 ... object-idn are the object identifications and predexpr is a boolean expression of multimedia predicates. For instance, the following authorization object: <object> <refer value='type.laser ..sensor' /> <cond>inside(id. computeLroom) </cond> </object> denotes all the laser sensor that are inside the computer room.
Implementation Guidelines
Our enforcement algorithm exploits the tree structure (DOM representation [10] ) of XML documents. More specifically, our enforcement is based on a tree labeling. The enforcement algorithm evaluates all applicable authorizations at once and translates them into labels with nodes of the tree, namely, elements and attributes of the documents. These labels consist of the authorization subject identity and the sign of the authorization. They are then propagated along the XML tree (see [4] for more details). Finally, all subtrees rooted at a node with a negative label or subtrees whose nodes are all unlabeled are discarded.
From the implementation point of view, tree labeling may be performed equally well programmatically (e.g., writing Java code) or using the XPath query engine of a server-side XSL transformer before releasing the multimedia data to the client. For instance, all the laser _sensor groups of our SVG example can be easily selected via a single XPath, namely root/ ... / g [@type=c laser --sensor']. It should however be noted that predicates of our model (e.g., inside, number _of and together _wi th) limit the scope of labeling and may introduce a performance burden on the enforcement algorithm, as they require linear scanning the XPath result node-set. Their execution goes as follows: for each node in the node set retrieved by the main XPath query identifying potential objects, an auxiliary XPath query is executed to extract all the node's siblings and check whether they satisfy the predicate; if this is the case, the current node gets labeled, otherwise it does not. On the other hand, single unnamed objects must be labeled by following the unique XPath leading to each of them. After labeling has been completed, the transformation phase will be performed on all nodes having a sign attribute; again, XSLT or Java code can be used.
4.
Examples of multimedia data protection
Next, we present some examples of protection requirements and illustrate how they can be expressed in our model. We assume that User is the root of the user-group hierachy and that Securi tyOfficer is a its sub-group. Also, subscribers to the quote service are not maintained at the system, and therefore handled with credentials stating the ability of the requestor to play the role of Subscribers or Fideli tySubscribers, The letters between brackets identify the authorizations in Figure 6 expressing the requirements. SVG document.
• Everybody can see t.he content of any room in the public area. [81] • Only members of the SecurityOfficer group whose job description is 'controller' can see the laser sensors and alarm controls.
[s2]
• Everybody can see the perimeter of any room in the private area.
[s3] VoiceXML document.
• All subscribers can get quotes but, but a corporate discount code can be issued only if a valid fidelity card (e.g., a credential) is attached to the request.
[vI]
• Individual users can place orders for 48-hour service only (fast deliveries are not accepted through this interface).
[v2]
Conclusions
We have presented a general yet powerful technique for fine-grained feature protection of XML-based multimedia formats. While our technique was originally aimed at controlled dissemination of multimedia information representing confidential or sensitive data (e.g., information about industrial plants or transportation and utility networks), other interesting potential applications of our feature protection technique are currently under discussion. XML-based standard multimedia formats, in particular graphical formats, are considered by many the natural SllCcessors of current proprietary formats for high volume distribution of graphical content, such as Macromedia Flash. High-volume distribution of graphics over the Internet presents a host of problems of its own, mainly related to digital rights management. Interestingly, however, some intellectual property-related protection problems can be straightforwardly mapped into our model. For instance, it is customary distribution graphics not to include information about layers, scenes, and other authoring-specific information, leaving only essential content for fast download and, more importantly, for theft prevention. Experience has shown that regardless of its low-level format, graphics whose semantics information has been stripped out is less easily hacked and modified by unauthorized persons. This issue promise to be an interesting extension point of the proposal presented in this paper.
